

SECURITY INFORMATION

TAB " A "


REPORT OF IAC REPRESENTATIVES' POST-MORTEM MEETING ON NIE-35/1

A. Summary of Post-Mortem Discussion on NIE-35/1

1. In general, National Estimates would benefit from better coordination between the field and Washington, and within the field itself.


- a. The field sometimes sends in information which is not properly noted or appreciated by Washington agencies. In reverse, the field often works in ignorance of exactly what Washington desires.
- b. An inter-agency ad hoc evaluative body of US officials has been established in Indochina, but, because of ignorance of what intelligence the respective field offices have, this is not as yet a satisfactory solution.
- c. The chief need of the field offices is precise and continuing guidance from Washington. As far as the preparation of National Estimates is concerned, a useful procedure would be the forwarding to the field of an Estimate's Terms of Reference, with a request that the field, if possible, submit a joint service contribution, fully documented from the raw intelligence, which would contain both agreed conclusions and service dissents therefrom.

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- b. It is difficult to determine to what degree Vietnamese press and official statements, as well as intelligence concerning Vietnamese developments, are initiated by the French.

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3. National Estimates suffer from insufficient intelligence on Chinese Communist intentions and capabilities in South China, and from an even more serious lack of intelligence concerning Viet Minh developments.

B. Suggested Measures Which Might Improve US Intelligence on Indochina

1. The establishing of a system of guidance to the field.
2. The establishing of a system of field contributions in the preparation of National Estimates.
3. The establishing in the field of a workable evaluative body and of an interchange of intelligence.
4. The tapping of Franco-Vietnamese interrogations of Viet Minh POW's.
5. The interrogating in Korea of POW's from the south China provinces.
6. The establishing of improved measures for the interrogating of travellers from south China, and the coordination of these efforts with the French and the British.
7. The addition of a US official at Hong Kong, charged with the responsibility of examining and evaluating provincial newspapers from south China.

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8. The addition of US company grade officers in Indochina, charged with the responsibility of getting intelligence from Vietnamese officers, independently of the French.

9. The addition of additional State Department junior officers in Indochina, charged with the responsibility of determining the attitudes of the Vietnamese, and the state of Vietnamese morale and political viability.

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
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B. Vietnam Developments

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained concerning the following:

1. What is the actual state of morale and political viability within Vietnam?
2. What are present attitudes of articulate Vietnamese public opinion, and of the general population, toward the French? The Viet Minh? The Chinese Communists? The Bao Dai regime? The US?
3. What are the prospects of success for the Vietnamese Army program?
4. What are the prospects of the present Vietnamese Government of Premier Huu for gaining wider support?
5. To what extent is improvement in the Indochinese situation dependent upon political developments? Upon military?

C. French Developments

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained concerning the following:

1. Have there actually been exploratory negotiations for some kind of "settlement" between French and Viet Minh officials? If so, what is the nature of these negotiations and what do they portend? If not, what is the source of rumors of such negotiations?

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D. Viet Minh Developments

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained concerning the following:

1. What is the state of morale among the Viet Minh leadership, army, and population?
2. What is the extent of consolidation of control over territories under Viet Minh military control?
3. What is the present role of Ho Chi Minh? Where is he? Who are the other important figures in the Viet Minh (backgrounds, responsibilities, etc.)?
4. What frictions, if any, exist between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists?
5. What relations are there, if any, between the Viet Minh and the Soviets?
6. What is the Viet Minh manpower situation? Food situation?

E. Chinese Communist Developments

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained on the following:

1. Chinese Communist Intentions. What aims does Communist China have with regard to Indochina? What is the relative importance to Communist China of Indochina? Do any frictions exist, or are they likely to, between Communist China and the USSR for ultimate domination of Indochina and Southeast Asia?
2. Chinese Communist "Advisors" with the Viet Minh. Exactly how many of these persons are there? How and where are they trained? How are these people integrated? What functions do they perform? What degree of control, if any, does their "advice" carry? Are these "advisors" largely technicians, or is there a large percentage of senior personnel? How are language differences bridged? How are traditional Chinese-Indochinese frictions bridged?

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3. Chinese Communist "Volunteers" with the Viet Minh. Are any Chinese military units attached to Viet Minh units? Are any Chinese attached as individuals to Viet Minh units? Have any Chinese been definitely identified in combat zones? What is the reliability of reports of Chinese "tribal" or "border" peoples serving with Viet Minh combat units? Do any Chinese "volunteers" perform garrison, support or rear-area functions? What is the reliability of reports of Chinese "volunteer" headquarters and training organizations? Are there any indications of the increased introduction of Chinese "volunteers" with the Viet Minh?

4. Chinese Communist Capabilities with Regard to Indochina. Chinese Communist OB in south China? Transportation routes and facilities within south China? Within Viet Minh territory? Chinese Communist stockpiling within south China? Within Viet Minh territory? Chinese Communist airfields within operational range? Chinese Communist-Viet Minh antiaircraft, radar, and early warning systems? Communist submarine and naval activity off the southeast China coast?